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Abstract 
 
The slave trades out of Africa represent one of the most significant forced migration 
experiences in history. In this paper I illustrate their long-term consequences on 
contemporaneous socio-economic outcomes, drawing from my own previous work on 
the topic and from an extensive review of the available literature. I first consider the 
influence of the slave trade on the “sending” countries in Africa, with attention to their 
economic, institutional, demographic, and social implications. Next I evaluate the 
consequences of the slave trade on the “receiving” countries in the Americas. Here I 
distinguish between the case of Latin America and that of the United States. Overall, I 
show that the slave trades exert a lasting impact along several contemporaneous socio-
economic dimensions and across diverse areas of the world. 
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conference participants, the editor of this journal. and an anonymous referee, for 
comments and suggestions. I am especially grateful to Arcangelo Dimico, with whom I 
co-authored many of the papers that are cited in this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
This contribution has been prepared for presentation as the Julian Simon Lecture at the 
12th IZA Annual Migration Meeting held in Dakar, Senegal, in April 2015. Just off the 
coast of Dakar, Gorée Island hosts the House of Slaves, a museum and memorial to the 
slave trade out of Africa, one of the most significant forced migration experiences in 
history and the main inspiration for this lecture.  
 
While the slave trades and slavery have long been the object of investigation by 
historians, a recent stream within the economics literature has focused on its potential 
long-term consequences on socio-economic outcomes. The aim of this paper is to 
present my own work and thoughts on this topic, and at the same time to collect a 
survey of the small but growing related literature.  
 
More broadly speaking, this contribution follows the tradition of  Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997),  Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu et al. (2001), who have 
searched the fundamental, rather than proximate, factors that have determined socio-
economic outcomes, with special attention for the potential role of institutional factors 
such as those shaping labor markets. My goal is to demonstrate that the institutions that 
permitted the slave trades and slavery, long after their abolition, are still exerting a 
profound influence on a variety of contemporaneous outcomes, across very diverse 
areas of the world.  
 
Partly because empirical investigations on the slave trade require often hard-to-find 
historical data, partly because research is simply in its infancy, the available literature 
including my own contributions has not so far been able to cover all the potentially-
affected geographical regions and all spheres of possible influence in a homogenous 
fashion. Nevertheless, it is possible to organize a presentation along two main axes. 
First, it is natural to distinguish between the long-lasting influence of the African slave 
trade for the “sending” countries on the one hand and the “receiving” ones on the other.  
Second, for each set of countries, it is useful to highlight a number of specific 
economic, institutional, demographic, and social implications which have attracted the 
attention of the literature.  For a selection of issues, I will present new data elaborations 
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based on datasets collected for my previous work. Since African slavery has represented 
one of the largest – albeit coerced – migration experiences in history, the paper will also 
emphasize the link between research on the slave trade and the literature on migration, 
even though this link is still relatively undeveloped.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I provide a short history of the African 
slave trades. In Section 3 I consider their influence on the sending countries in Africa, 
with attention to its economic, institutional, demographic, and social implications. In 
Section 4 I evaluate the consequences of the slave trade on the receiving countries, 
drawing a further distinction between Latin America and the United States. For the 
latter I also briefly discuss the subsequent experiences of the Second Middle Passage 
and of the Great Migration. Section 5 concludes and collects ideas and suggestions for 
future research.  
 
2. A brief history of the slave trade 
 
Over the five centuries running from 1400 to 1900, the slave trade encompassed four 
distinct waves: the trans-Saharan, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and trans-Atlantic slave 
trades. The last one was by far the most significant in terms of volume and duration: 
over the 1529-1850 period over 12 million Africans were embarked, mostly along the 
coasts of West Africa, and forced to undertake the Middle Passage across the Atlantic 
Ocean  (see Berlin, 2003 for a historical account, and Eltis et al., 1999 and Curtin, 1969 
for data). The peak was reached between 1780 and 1790, with 80,000 slaves per year 
being transported, but the traffic remained very intense during the nineteenth century, 
when between 3 and 4 million people were embarked. Throughout the period, the 
Portuguese were always at the center of the trade: they were the ones that initiated it and 
they continued it long after Britain outlawed it in 1807. The involvement of Britain 
culminated in the eighteenth century. France also had a prominent role, followed by 
Spain, the Netherlands, and the United States. The decline started after 1807, even 
though the process was very slow and became significant only after mid-nineteenth 
century when Brazil joined in. The three other slave trades pre-dated the trans-Atlantic 
wave and followed different paths: the trans-Saharan trade took people from the sub-
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Saharan regions to Northern Africa, while both the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea trades 
took people from Eastern Africa and delivered them to various parts of Asia. Overall, 
the volume of these three waves comprised half of that involved in the trans-Atlantic 
one. The trans-Atlantic trades are by far the better documented ones, thanks to the Trans 
Atlantic Slave Trade (TAST) Database (see www.slavevoyages.org and the description 
in Eltis et al., 1999). Based on these data, Table 1 reports the number of slaves 
embarked from Africa, by broad embarkation regions and by 100-year periods. West-
Central Africa represented the main source, with 45 percent of the overall volume. Next 
came  Benin (16 percent), Biafra (13 percent), the Gold Coast (10 percent), and 
Senegambia (6 percent).  
 
Table 1: Embarked Slaves During the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade 
 
Senegambia  
Sierra 
Leone 
Windward 
Coast Gold Coast 
Bight of 
Benin 
Bight of 
Biafra 
West 
Central 
Africa  
South-east 
Africa  Totals 
1501-1600 147281 1405 2482 0 0 8459 117878 0 277505 
1601-1700 136104 6843 1350 108679 269812 186322 1134807 31715 1875632 
1701-1800 363187 201985 289583 1014529 1284585 904616 2365204 70930 6494619 
1801-1900 108941 178537 43454 86114 444662 495164 2076685 440022 3873579 
Totals 755513 388770 336869 1209322 1999059 1594561 5694574 542667 12521335 
Source: TAST Database – Voyages: http://www.slavevoyages.org/. 
 
Slavery was already present in Africa before the slave trades and in fact continues, in 
some parts of the continent, to the present day.  Europe experienced slavery as well. The 
Roman Empire was in fact a slave society. However, by 1400 slavery had long 
disappeared from Europe, which motivated the European search for a supply of forced 
labor in the African continent. African slaves were collected by kidnapping by other 
Africans or as the result of local wars among Africans. The captives were then sold to 
foreign traders, together with gold and ivory, in exchange for imported goods including 
firearms. The consequent so-called gun-slave cycle fueled the perpetuation of the slave 
trade for centuries. In turn, the incentive to purchase slaves on the part of the Europeans 
rested in the need to collect manpower for the expansions of the plantation economies 
being developed in South and Central America after Columbus, to satisfy the quickly 
increasing taste in Europe for colonial goods such as tobacco and sugar.  Again based 
on the TAST Database, Table 2 reports the number of slaves disembarked in different 
regions, by broad disembarkation regions and by 100-year periods. A comparison with 
Table 1 reveals that almost 2 million people were lost during transportation. The main 
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destination was Brazil (45 percent), next came the Caribbean (22 and 10 percent, 
respectively, for the British and French portions) and the Spanish Americas (12 
percent). Less than 4 percent were taken to North America. 
 
Table 2: Disembarked Slaves During the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade 
 
Europe 
North 
America 
British 
Caribbean 
French 
Caribbean 
Dutch 
Americas 
Danish 
W. Indies 
Spanish 
Americas Brazil Africa Totals 
1501-1600 640 0 0 0 0 0 169370 29275 0 199285 
1601-1700 2981 15147 310477 38685 124158 18146 225504 784457 3122 1522677 
1701-1800 5240 295482 1813323 995133 295215 68608 145533 1989017 2317 5609868 
1801-1900 0 78117 194452 86397 25355 22244 752505 2061625 150130 3370825 
Totals 8861 388746 2318252 1120215 444728 108998 1292912 4864374 155569   10702655 
Source: TAST Database – Voyages: http://www.slavevoyages.org/. 
 
The coerced population movement set into place by the trans-Atlantic slave trade was 
only the beginning of a very long mobilization process that has not yet stopped. Indeed 
Berlin (2010) has influentially portrayed the history of people of African descent in the 
United States as framed by four great migrations. The first was the Middle Passage, 
which in the course of  the sixteenth and  seventeenth centuries took people from Africa 
to North America. During the first half of the nineteenth century the Second Middle 
Passage involved the transportation of one million African-American slaves from the 
Atlantic coastal regions to the plantations in the interior. The third migratory round, 
which was no longer forced by voluntary, witnessed the relocation of 6 million free 
people of African descent from the rural South to the Northern cities, starting from 1915 
with the Great Migration, and continuing until the 1970s. Lastly, between the end of the 
twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries, new Global Passages of  
migrants of African descent arrived in the United States from the regions that had 
hosted the previous out-of-Africa coerced diasporas, i.e., the Caribbean, Latin America, 
Africa, and Europe.  
 
3. The consequences of the slave trade in Africa 
 
This section is devoted to the long-run consequences of the coerced migration of 
millions of people from Africa, with a focus on the trans-Atlantic experience. To 
organize the presentation, I first look at the impact on local economic development and 
institutions. The second sub-section turns to the influence on demographics, family 
structure, and gender roles. 
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3.1. The impact on economic development and institutions 
 
A first wave of research on the influence of history on African economic and 
institutional development has focused on the colonial period (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 
2001, Bertocchi and Canova, 2002, and Bertocchi, 2011). The long-term implications of 
pre-colonial institutions in Africa has been discussed among others by Manning (1990), 
Herbst (2000), Bockstette et al. (2002), Gennaioli and Rainer (2006), and 
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013).  
 
A new research line initiated by Nunn (2008a) has instead concentrated on the slave 
trades period. Nunn (2008a) presents a systematic empirical analysis of the effects of 
the slave trades on current economic performance. His first contribution is a database 
reporting estimates of the number of slaves exported from each contemporary African 
country in each century from 1400 to 1900. The estimates, which are based on shipping 
records including the TAST Database (Eltis et al., 1999) and a variety of historical 
sources, also report the ethnic identity of slaves. The second contribution is to show a 
robust negative relationship between the number of slaves exported from a country and 
per capita income in 2000, despite evidence that the slave trades were more intense in 
the most developed and most densely populated areas in Africa. Through two-stage 
least-square estimation (where the sailing distances from each country to the nearest 
locations of demand for slaves are employed as instruments), he can also establish that 
this relationship is causal. Moreover, he suggests that the channels behind the observed 
relationship have to be found in the fact that the slave trades impeded the formation of 
broader ethnic identities. By stopping the homogenization of ethnic differences. They 
lead to fractionalization and weak and fragmented political structures. The impact of the 
slave trade on ethnic stratification has also been studied by Whatley and Gillezeau 
(2011), who establish the existence of a positive relationship between current ethnic 
fragmentation and slave exports from West Africa.  
 
Following the lead of Nunn (2008a), several authors have further explored the long-
term influence of the slave trades along a number of dimensions. Nunn and Wantchekon 
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(2011) investigate the link between the slave trades and trust. Given the importance of 
trust for economic and institutional development, it may well be the case that it is 
through this channel that the slave trade still exerts its influence today. The hypothesis 
is that the slave trades may have generated a culture of mistrust, because of the way 
slaves were captured by other Africans through raids involving neighboring 
communities, thus breaking the social bonds upon which trust is built. The hypothesis is 
tested over the data by Nunn (2008a) on the number of slaves by ethnic group and 
contemporaneous survey data by Afrobarometer providing measures of trust. They find 
a robust negative link between slave trades and trust, i.e., individuals whose ancestors 
were more exposed to the slave trade are today less trusting. Historic distance from the 
coast is employed as an instrument for the slave trades to perform two-stage least-
square estimation indicating that this link is indeed causal. The authors investigate two 
potential channels of transmission, culture and institutions. The former runs through the 
diffusion of cultural norms, beliefs, and values founded on distrust, the latter through 
the weakening of trust-enforcing institutions. They conclude that both channels are at 
work, but that the former is much stronger than the second.  
 
Again using the data by Nunn (2008a) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) combined 
with the Afrobarometer surveys, in Bertocchi et al. (2015) my coauthors and I examine 
the relationship between trust and attitudes towards citizenship acquisition. We find that 
individuals who are more trusting show more positive attitudes towards the acquisition 
of citizenship by migrants, both at birth and by naturalization (see Bertocchi and 
Strozzi, 2010, 2008 on the link between citizenship laws and migration). These findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the slave trade generated a culture of mistrust 
that increased the incentive to distinguish insiders from outsiders, with implications for 
the shaping of immigration policies in contemporary Africa.    
 
The implications of the slave trade can also be shaped by its interaction with geography 
and the climate. Nunn and Puga (2012) look at the interaction between ruggedness and 
the effects of the slave trades on current development. Ruggedness can represent a 
protection from slave raids despite its simultaneous negative effect on trade and 
economic activity. They find that a beneficial effect of rugged terrain is only present in 
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the African continent, and can therefore be explained by the history of slavery. More 
broadly, these results suggest that geography can affect development through its 
interaction with past historical events. Fenske and Kala (2015) examine the interaction 
between the slave trade and climate. They compile a yearly panel of temperatures and 
slave exports and find that the latter declined in warmer years, which can be explained 
by the positive association between temperature and mortality and the negative 
association between temperature and agricultural productivity. In turn cold weather – 
which reduced participation in the slave trade – predicts higher economic activity in 
contemporary Africa.   
 
Turning to the impact of the slave trade on political institutions, Whatley (2012a) 
focuses on political authority in West Africa using data from the Ethnographic Atlas 
(Murdock, 1967) and finds that, in the pre-colonial era,  the trans-Atlantic slave trade 
increased absolutism and  reduced democracy and liberalism. This negative influence on 
West-African political institutions persisted past the colonial era. In particular, he shows 
that British colonies that exported more slaves were subject to a larger degree to indirect 
rule. In turn, under indirect rule the colonial administration relied more heavily on local 
absolutisms as a means of control. Absolutist political customs developed into the rule 
of law, persisted to post-colonial days, and can still explain state failure in the African 
continent (see Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 2011, 2012 on the determinants and 
consequences of state fragility in contemporary Africa).  
 
While the consequences of the slave trade are received increasing attention within the 
economics literature, still scarce attention has been paid to the determinants of the slave 
trade itself. One exception is Whatley (2012b), who looks at the causes of the expansion 
in the trans-Atlantic slave trade during the eighteenth  century. While the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade lasted over 400 years, a rapid, five-fold growth episode in fact occurred in 
the eighteenth century. He combines data from the TA Database and the Anglo-African 
Trade Statistics (Johnson et al., 1990) to build a time series of annual observations on 
the British slave trade that spans the period 1699-1807, i.e., until the abolition of the 
slave trade by Britain. For the first part of the century he finds evidence of a gun-slave 
cycle, suggesting that African people were enslaved by other Africans and traded in 
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exchange of firearms, which in turn sustained internal wars. These findings confirm the 
British abolitionists’ claim that the slave trades caused African conflict rather than the 
opposite.  
 
A paper by Fenske and Kala (2014) focuses instead on the consequences of British 
abolition. The authors argue that abolition increased the incidence of conflict in the 
areas within Africa affected by the slave trade. Using geo-coded data on conflicts they 
show a discontinuous increase after 1807, which occurred both in West Africa, where 
the slave trade declined, and West-Central and South-East Africa, where the trade 
increased as a result. They interpret these findings as follow. In West Africa the decline 
of the slave trade challenged pre-existing political authorities who defended their 
interests through violence.  In the other regions, enslavement intensified and was often 
achieved through violent means. The persistent effect of abolition translates in harsher 
conflict today in the regions where slave exports increased after 1807.  
 
3.2. The impact on demographics, family structure, and gender roles 
 
Even though to separate the existing contributions on the slave trade in Africa according 
to the chosen two sub-sections is somewhat arbitrary, it makes it easier to identify and 
describe a parallel line of research that starts with Fage (1980), Thornton (1980), and 
Manning (1981), who highlight the implications of the slave trade for population growth 
in Africa (see also Manning, 2010 and Frankema and Jerven, 2014, for more recent 
projections). As a result of the enslavement and shipping of captives, among whom men 
often outnumbered women, population declined and the gender balance was distorted. 
As a result in 1850 Africa had a population of about 50 million, while the level it would 
have reached in the absence of the slave trades was estimated to be 100 million: thus, 
the continent lost to the slave trades half of its population. The unbalanced sex ratio 
provoked a further reduction of population growth, with implications for family 
structure and male-female relations. Polygyny spread, while matrilinearity weakened. 
Classic references on the African family structure, from an anthropological and 
historical perspective, include Boserup (1970), Goody (1973), and Todd (1984), who 
describe the conditions that, long before the slave trades, determined the diffusion of 
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polygyny in Africa, due to agricultural conditions which made female labor valuable.  
The diffusion of polygyny in Africa was reinforced by the slave trade, because of male 
scarcity and the simultaneous need to sustain reproduction rates.  
 
The connection between the slave trade and contemporaneous polygyny is investigated 
by several related studies. Dalton and Leung (2014) combine the historical data on the 
slave trades from Nunn (2008a) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) with 
contemporaneous polygyny data from the female Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS). They show that the higher polygyny rates in Western Africa, if compared to 
Eastern Africa, can be explained by the slave trades, since the preference for male 
slaves was a distinctive feature of the trans-Atlantic trade out of Western Africa, while 
the opposite occurred for the Indian Ocean and Red Sea trades out of  Eastern Africa. 
These results are robust to controls for age, religion, urban location, education, and 
wealth, as well as to instrumental variables estimation. Edlund and Ku (2011) stress that 
polygyny in sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by late but universal marriage for men 
(general polygyny), which differs from the case where only high-quality men obtain 
more wives thus leaving lower-quality men unmarried. While the latter form of 
polygyny tends to be driven by inequality, they confirm that general polygyny is linked 
to the slave trade. Their measure of polygyny is based on United Nations data on the 
number of married women over the number of married men (for 15 to 49 years old). 
Within a broad analysis of the determinants of African polygyny, Fenske (2013) uses 
the DHS household-level codification and confirms the existence of a link with the 
slave trades, albeit with the warning that the latter can only predict polygamy across 
broad regions, i.e., West Africa against the rest of the continent.   
 
In Bertocchi and Dimico (2015) my coauthor and I build on the relationship between 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade (from the Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011 dataset) and 
contemporaneous polygyny, which is confirmed across the household, male, and female 
DHS samples. In particular, we employ a proxy for the intensity of the slave trades 
represented by the implied, negative demographic shock, since data on population 
growth present the advantage of being available at a finer, district level.  
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Using the dataset compiled for Bertocchi and Dimico (2015),  based on the household 
sample, in Table 3 I run a simple bivariate regression where polygyny enters as the 
dependent variable while the trans-Atlantic slave trade enters as the regressor. The 
highly significant and positive coefficient illustrates the strong link between the two 
variables.  
 
                                      Table 3. The Slave Trade and Polygyny in Africa  
 Estimation Method: OLS  Dependent variable:  Polygyny 
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade (log (1+x)) 0.0233*** 
 (0.0059) 
Observations 195,758 
RMSE 0.400 
Sample Households 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust t statistics in parentheses. The source of the data is Bertocchi 
and Dimico (2015). 
 
In Bertocchi and Dimico (2015) we further extend the analysis of the influence of the 
slave trade by looking at sexual behavior and HIV infection. What is peculiar about sub-
Saharan Africa is that HIV incidence is much more common among women, 
particularly younger ones. Violence against women, poor health services, lack of 
education, and unsafe sexual behavior are commonly suggested in order to explain these 
facts. The paper starts by showing that, throughout  sub-Saharan Africa, the slave trades 
are associated with a negative demographic shock. Next it shows that polygyny is 
strongly associated with higher HIV infection rates. To establish the causal nexus 
running from polygyny to HIV infection, the demographic shock following the slave 
trade is used as an instrument for polygyny. The paper also investigates the underlying 
transmission channel, by arguing that polygyny is associated with unsatisfying marital 
relationships, particularly for the women involved. As a consequence,  women tend to 
be more prone to extramarital partnerships. Since promiscuous sexual habits represent 
one of the main channels of transmission of HIV, there should then be an association 
between the prevalence of polygyny and the risk of infection. This effect is reinforced 
by co-wives cohabitation, since the presence of several women sharing the same roof 
with a single husband exerts a multiplying influence on exposure. The above hypothesis 
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is tested using DHS indicators of sexual behavior. Sexual activity, measured as the 
likelihood that an individual had sexual activity within the last four weeks, is confirmed 
as being positively associated with infection rates.  Female infidelity, measured with the 
number of extramarital partners within the last twelve months, is also strongly 
connected with HIV. To establish causality, the paper again relies on the link between 
the demographic shock that followed the slave trade and sexual behavior, thus 
uncovering a sort of primordial risk factor for HIV which finds its roots in the slave 
trade epoch.   
 
Again using DHS data, another related contribution by Teso (2014) turns the attention 
on the influence of the trans-Atlantic slave trade on gender roles. He argues that the 
unbalanced sex ratios determined by the enslavement of men pushed women into the 
labor force and changed their role in the labor market by altering the division of labor in 
society. He uses the data from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) on the number of slaves 
by ethnicity and matches them with DHS data on employment status, women’s 
participation in household decisions, and attitudes toward domestic violence, as well as 
with Afrobarometer data on opinions about women in politics. He shows that ethnic 
groups that were more severely affected by the trans-Atlantic slave trade are today more 
likely to exhibit higher female labor force participation and more equal gender-role 
attitudes. 
 
4. The consequences of the slave trade outside Africa 
 
This section is devoted to the influence of African slavery outside of Africa, with a 
focus on the trans-Atlantic experience and thus on New World economies. The impact 
of the influx of slaves from Africa on the countries in the Americas has been 
emphasized in seminal work by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), who argue that 
differences in factor endowments implied differences in the reliance on slave labor, with 
dramatic consequences for the degree of inequality. Extreme historical  inequalities – in 
wealth, human capital, and political power – then exerted a permanent influence on 
economic development, since they favored the endogenous formation of institutional 
structures that, rather than promoting growth, maintained the privileges of the elites 
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against the interests of the masses. Nunn (2008b) tests the Engerman-Sokoloff  
hypothesis in two settings: across 29 former New World countries and across United 
States counties and states. In both settings, he finds a negative impact of past slavery on 
current development (even though this impact is not driven by plantation slavery). He 
also investigates whether inequality is the channel through which slavery adversely 
affects current performances, but he finds no support for this mechanism. Over a world-
wide sample of 46 countries including also North-African and Southern-European 
recipients of African slaves, Soares et al. (2012) find a significant correlation between 
past slavery and current levels of inequality. The economics of labor coercion from the 
perspective of productive efficiency is modeled by Lagerlöf (2009) and Acemoglu and 
Wolitzky (2011). A part for the exceptions just mentioned,  most of the research on the 
long-term effects of African slavery has focused on individual countries. In the first 
sub-section below, I report evidence on Latin America and the Caribbean, while the 
subsequent sub-section covers the United States.  
 
4.1. Latin America and the Caribbean  
 
The Eastern coast of Latin America and the Caribbean by far received the largest share 
of African slaves, albeit with marked cross-country heterogeneities. As shown in Table 
2, the highest number of slaves was transported to Brazil and the Caribbean 
(particularly Haiti and Jamaica), while other countries, such as Bolivia, hardly received 
any. Since this area is currently characterized by deep inequalities, past slavery is a 
candidate explanation that deserves close attention. 
 
Drawing on Bertocchi (2015), I will start with Brazil, which was the destination of 
almost half of the African slaves shipped across the Atlantic, ten times the number of 
those sent to today's United States. Brazil was also the last country in the Americas to 
abolish slavery in 1888. On the other hand, for centuries Brazil witnessed the 
coexistence of free and enslaved blacks: at the end of the eighteenth century 25 percent 
of the blacks were already free. At the same time, the local elites encouraged the 
formation of a sort of class division among blacks, used as a means to divide and 
control a huge and thus potentially dangerous black population, which represented 50 
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percent of the total in 1822. However, because of high mortality and low fertility, the 
slave population declined very quickly after the end of the trades in the central years of 
the nineteenth century, while at the same time the flow of European immigrants was fast 
growing. As a result, by the time slavery was abolished in 1888, slaves were only 5 
percent of the Brazilian population. Together with the custom of inter-racial marriage, 
these demographic dynamics can explain why in this country slavery never produced 
the forms of segregation observed, for instance, in the United States. The empirical 
evidence on Brazil brings mixed results. Within a  county-level analysis of the state of 
São Paulo, the largest in the country, Summerhill (2010) finds that the intensity of 
slavery has a negligible effect on income in 2000. Moreover, a measure of agricultural 
inequality for 1905 exerts no negative influence on long-term development. He 
therefore concludes that neither slavery nor historical inequality have a discernable 
economic effect in the long run. However, a negative influence of past slavery emerges 
in other studies that concentrate on human capital formation. Across Brazilian federal 
units, Wegenast (2010) uncovers a negative correlation between past land inequality, 
which was strongly correlated with the presence of crops suitable for the use of slave 
labor and thus with slavery, and quantitative and qualitative measures of contemporary 
education, such as secondary school attendance in 2000 and school quality in 2005.  In 
the latifundia system based on slave labor, landlords historically had no incentive to 
develop mass educational institutions, and this attitude persisted even after abolition in 
1888, with consequences still visible today. Similarly, Musacchio et al. (2014) show 
that over the 1889-1930 period Brazilian states with a lower intensity of slavery were 
able to exploit positive trade shocks and invest the resulting export tax revenues in 
elementary education expenditures. The opposite occurs in states with more slaves. The 
effects persist on the contemporary distribution of human capital.  
 
For the case of Colombia, Acemoglu et al. (2012) investigate the impact of slavery on 
long-run development by exploiting the variation in the presence of gold mines in 
different municipalities, since gold mining was strongly associated with demand for 
slave labor. The empirical findings show that the historical presence of slavery is 
associated with higher poverty, land inequality, and black population shares, and with 
lower school enrollment and vaccination coverage. For Puerto Rico, Bobonis and 
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Morrow (2014) report evidence on the impact of the libreta system, a local form of labor 
coercion introduced in 1849 after an agreement between Spain and Britain to enforce 
the abolition of the slave trade. The libreta de facto replaced slavery, and remained in 
place until 1874. By exploiting variation in the suitability of coffee cultivation and 
changes in world coffee prices, they estimate how the response of schooling to coffee 
price changes across municipalities. They find that coercion depresses the effective 
wages of unskilled labor, inducing more schooling than in the case without coercion. In 
other words, the abolition of forced labor reduced the incentive to accumulate human 
capital, consistently with the fact that abolition increased the relative wages of unskilled 
laborers. Incidentally, parallel evidence of the effect of  the enslavement of the 
American indigenous population is provided by Dell (2010), who examines a region 
within modern-day Peru that experienced another form of labor coercion, the mining 
mita. The effects of the mita are detrimental for current household consumption and 
children's growth, while its influence on education has faded over time.  
 
In summary, the available evidence points to heterogeneous effects of slavery on long-
term development. These mixed results may be due to the confounding influence of 
other interacting factors common to the South-Central America experience, such as the 
generally slow expansion of mass education, irrespectively of race (see Mariscal and 
Sokoloff,  2000) and a culture of assimilation favoring integration and racial mixing.  
 
4.2. The United States 
 
Slavery was introduced in the territories that today represent the United States in the 
sixteenth century, much later than in Spanish South America and Brazil. The scope was 
to replace European and African indentured servants as the main source of plantation 
labor, at the time mostly employed for the cultivation of rice and tobacco. Between  
1675 and 1695 the import expanded rapidly.  By the 1720s Virginia and Maryland had 
been transformed into slave societies. Overall, the inflow to the United States, 
throughout the next centuries, amounted to an estimated 645,000 slaves, brought in 
mostly from Africa. The slaves were initially disembarked along the Atlantic coast and 
forcibly settled in the coastal Southern colonies. Even though the United States 
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absorbed less than 4 percent of the entire volume of the trans-Atlantic trade, the local 
reproduction rate was much higher than elsewhere so that the slave population, unlike in 
the rest of the Americas, expanded. By the 1730s births to slave women outnumbered 
import, with an increase of the African population at an annual rate of 3 percent. As a 
result, at the start of the American Revolution the region was no longer an immigrant 
society. Later on, in the 1789-1860 period between the Revolution and the Civil War, 
most slaves were relocated in the inland regions where the plantation economy was 
quickly expanding following the booming international demand for cotton. This Second 
Middle Passage ended only with the Confederate defeat in the Civil War. Despite the 
fact that the Revolution broke the coincidence between blackness and slavery, between 
1800 and 1860 the slave population increased from 1 to 4 million, so that by the 1860 
census the United States had a slave population of about 13 percent of the total, 
distributed within 15 slave states, mostly belonging to the South. The American Civil 
War led to the abolition of slavery in 1865. The Reconstruction period, running from 
1865 to 1877, witnessed a transformation of Southern society and the enactment of 
legislation favoring the rights of former slaves. However, soon afterwards the white 
elites were able to restore their control and to introduce restrictive Black Codes and 
disfranchisement provisions. The next massive movement of the African American 
population occurred between 1916 and 1930, with the so-called Great Migration from 
the rural South to the urban North, pulled by new job opportunities in the Northern 
cities and pushed by the crisis of the cotton economy. The latter was caused by the boll 
weevil beetle infestation and also by the social and political conditions of blacks in the 
South. Black emigration from the South slowed down after 1930 but picked up again 
after World War Two. It continued at differentiated speeds until the 1970s, reaching a 
total volume of 6 million, with a partial reversal after that.  
 
Early contributions on the economic impact of slavery in the United States  include the 
influential although controversial book by the economic historians Fogel and Engerman 
(1974), where they argue that slavery in the antebellum South was an efficient 
production arrangement. Contrasting views were expressed among others by David  and 
Stampp (1976) and Ransom and Sutch (2001). The more recent literature I focus on has 
investigated the long-term consequences of slavery on development. Across states over 
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the 1880-1980 period, Mitchener and McLean (2003) find a negative and persistent 
effect on productivity levels. Lagerlöf (2005) explores the link between geography and 
slavery and also  uncovers a negative relationship between slavery and current income. 
Both across states and counties, Nunn (2008b) reports a negative effect of slavery on 
per capita income in 2000.  
 
Using the dataset collected by Bertocchi and Dimico (2010),  in Table 4 I provide 
empirical evidence on the cross-county influence of slavery on the contemporaneous 
level of development in the United States. Slavery is measured as the share of slaves to 
the total population in 1860, while the dependent variable is per capita income in 
different years. After entering geographical controls meant to capture structural 
differences among different regions of the United States (i.e., dummies for counties 
within former slave states and for counties within North-Eastern and South-Atlantic 
states), the relationship is not significant for per capita income in 2000. Across previous 
decades, the relationship was still significant in 1970, but no longer so in 1980 and 
1990. This suggests that the effect of slavery on income is not a robust one. 
 
Table 4: Slavery and Income per Capita, United States, 1970 to 2000  
Estimation Method: OLS                         Dependent Variable: Per Capita Income 
 2000 1990 1980 1970 
Slaves/Population 1860  -0.0249 -0.0335 -0.0418  -0.134***  
 (-0.79) (-1.12) (-1.25) (-4.34) 
Observations 1960 1960 1959 1959 
R-squared 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.39 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust t statistics in parentheses. Additional controls: Population density in 1860, 
dummies for North East, South Atlantic, and slave states. The source of the data is Bertocchi and Dimico (2010).   
 
Turning to the link between slavery and current inequality, in Table 5 I present results 
for different indicators, all measured in year 2000: income inequality and racial 
inequality (both computed as Gini indexes) and the fraction of the population below the 
poverty level. Using the same specification as in Table 4, i.e., controlling for structural 
differences across regions, for all dependent variables slavery always retains a positive 
and significant coefficient. Thus, there is robust evidence that the distribution of per 
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capita income is more unequal today in counties associated in the past with a larger 
proportion of slaves in the population, and so is the racial dimension of inequality, 
while poverty is more wide-spread. 
 
Table 5: Slavery and Measures of Inequality, United States, 2000 
Estimation Method: OLS                                                 Dependent Variables: 
 Income Inequality Racial Inequality Population Below Poverty  
Slaves/Population 1860 0.0374*** 0.178*** 0.0575*** 
 (7.42) (26.33) (6.40) 
Observations 1984 1984 1984 
R-squared 0.31 0.40 0.32 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust t statistics in parentheses. Additional controls: Population 
density in 1860, dummies for North East, South Atlantic, and slave states. The source of the data is 
Bertocchi and Dimico (2010).   
 
Furthermore, over a state-level panel dataset of educational attainment across races over 
the 1940-2000 period collected by  Bertocchi and Dimico (2010), in Table 6 I regress 
the educational racial gap, at the high-school and bachelor level, on the share of slaves 
in the population in 1860: the coefficient is significantly positive, which suggests that  
the impact of slavery may run through the evolution of  the educational gap (Table 6).  
Indeed, after the Civil War and abolition, illiteracy was predominant among blacks, and 
progress was very slow until the eve of World War Two.  
 
Table 6: Slavery and  the Racial Educational Gap, United States, 1940-2000 
Estimation Method: Pooled OLS                Dependent  Variables: 
  High-School Gap  Bachelor Gap 
Slaves/Population 1860 4.404***   4.105*** 
 (5.36)  (3.56) 
Observations 258  258 
R-squared 0.65  0.43 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust t statistics in parentheses.  Additional controls: Population and 
dummies for slave states and time. The source of the data is Bertocchi and Dimico (2010).   
 
The hypothesis according to which human capital formation may represent the channel 
through which the effect of slavery still lingers on in American society echoes of a large 
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literature on race and human capital including Smith (1984), Margo (1990), Sacerdote 
(2005), and Canaday and Tamura (2009). The same hypothesis  is further developed and 
tested in Bertocchi and Dimico (2014), where my coauthor and I employ a Theil 
decomposition to disentangle the two components of income inequality: inequality 
across races (racial inequality) and inequality within races (within inequality). The 
negative and significant influence of slavery is confirmed after controlling for factor 
endowments and running two-stage least-square regressions. An alternative hypothesis 
might attribute the effect of slavery on current inequality to racial discrimination. 
Indeed the bond between slavery and racism, which was non associated with slavery in 
the Old World and is much weaker in today’s Latin America, is perceived as 
particularly strong in the United States. To test this additional hypothesis, we create a 
measure of racial discrimination based on returns to skills, estimate returns to education 
for blacks and whites, and compute the ratio of average returns for blacks to average 
returns for whites. The latter turns out to be well below 1, consistently with the presence 
of discrimination. Using this proxy we do find that racial discrimination contributes to 
inequality, but to a much lesser degree if compared to the human capital transmission 
channel. This conclusion is consistent with Fryer (2011), who argues that relative to the 
twentieth century the relevance of discrimination as an explanation for racial 
inequalities has declined, since racial differences are greatly reduced when one accounts 
for educational achievement. We conclude with suggestive evidence that the underlying 
links between past slavery and current inequality run through the political exclusion of 
former slaves and the resulting negative influence on the local provision of education 
for black children.  
 
In a companion investigation also by Bertocchi and Dimico (2012a), my coauthor and I 
shed further light on the evolution of racial educational inequality across states from 
1940 to 2000, extending the results illustrated in Table 6. Despite a gradual reduction of 
the gap over this period, the evidence shows that the racial gap at the high-school and 
bachelor level is determined by the initial gap in 1940, which is in turn largely 
explained by past slavery. The correlation between the racial educational gap in 1940 
and the share of slaves over population in 1860 is in fact 0.90 and 0.81, at the high-
school and bachelor level respectively. Two-stage least-square regressions where 
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slavery is used as an instrument for the initial gap confirm this conclusion. The issue of 
the excludability of slavery is addressed by instrumenting it with the share of 
disembarked slaves from the trans-Atlantic slave trade, i.e., accounting for the link 
between the geographic slave distribution following the Middle Passage and the one 
prevailing after the Second Middle Passage. We also find that income growth over the 
same period is negatively correlated with the initial racial gap in education, which 
suggests that slavery also exerts an indirect effect on growth through the education 
channel. 
 
In Bertocchi and Dimico (2012b) my coauthor and I extend the analysis of the political 
implications of slavery using a unique dataset on voting registration by race assembled 
for the counties in the state of Mississippi in 1896,  in the middle of the period that 
witnesses the restoration of the white elites’ supremacy. We show that the 
disfranchisement measures introduced with the new 1890 state constitution (i.e., the 
requirement of a poll tax and a literacy test  for voting registration) negatively affect the 
political participation of blacks. However, we also show that the decline starts even 
earlier, reflecting a process of institutionalization of de facto disfranchisement and thus 
supporting the fait accompli hypothesis advanced by Key (1949). Black registration is 
shown to be more limited in the presence of a larger share of black population, which is 
in turn highly correlated with a larger share of slaves before abolition. This can be 
explained by the fact that a majority of black voters represents a more serious threat to 
white supremacy. The paper also shows that restrictions in black political participation 
affect educational policies in a persistent fashion, consistently with the previously-
mentioned contributions. Naidu (2012) also contains an analysis of the consequences of 
the disfranchisement measures introduced in Southern states on political and 
educational outcomes. Acharya et al. (2016) show that contemporary differences in 
political attitudes still reflect the intensity of slavery in 1860, with Southern whites 
more likely to support the Republican party and oppose affirmative action policies in 
counties more affected by slavery historically. They interpret these results as the long-
term consequences of the conservative political attitudes that developed after the Civil 
War.  
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Again with special attention to Mississippi data, Chay and Munshi (2013) focus on the 
subsequent epoch which, between 1916 and 1930, witnessed the Great Migration of  
one million of former slaves from the South to the North of the United States. They find 
that blacks coming from counties characterized by labor intensive plantation crops 
represented a disproportionate share of Northern migrants. They attribute this finding to 
the development of social network externalities that became instrumental in the 
mobilization process when large coalition of blacks moved together to Northern cities.   
 
As for the case of Africa, the influence of slavery on gender roles and cultural norms 
has been investigated also for the case of the United States. Mohinyan (1965) argues 
that the structure of the black family has been undermined by slavery, with broad 
consequences on crime and the social condition of blacks. Slavery has also been 
proposed as an explanation for the racial gap in female labor force participation. 
Boustan and Collins (2014) show that for over a century, that is from 1870 until at least 
1980, black women were more likely than white women to participate in the labor force 
and to hold jobs in agriculture or manufacturing. They also show that differences in 
observables cannot fully account for this racial gap, which confirms the intuition in 
Goldin (1977). The latter suggests that female labor force participation reflects a 
“double legacy” of slavery. A direct effect may have come from the low levels of 
income and education for blacks, which pushed more black women into the labor 
market. Moreover, an indirect effect may have come from an intergenerational 
transmission channel: since black women were forced to work intensively under 
slavery, African Americans developed different cultural norms about women’s work, 
with consequent long-term effects.  Another cultural implication of slavery is examined 
by Gouda (2013), who shows that the slave share in 1860 is correlated with 
contemporary violent crime, suggesting that the culture of violence that developed 
under slavery still exerts a lasting effect.  
 
Beside education, human capital is also shaped by health conditions. The hypothesis 
that the racial gap in life expectancy may be linked to the slave trades has been 
advanced by Cutler et al. (2005), who present evidence suggesting that racial 
differences in sensitivity to salt, a leading and largely hereditary cause of hypertension, 
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may be due to selection during the Middle Passage. Because of intense water loss, the 
ability to retain salt and hence water substantially increased the chances of survival, 
which induced slave traders to select captives on the basis of the salt on their skin. 
Bhalotra and  Venkataramani (2012) find  that the  impact on adult education and labor 
market outcomes of the reduction in pneumonia in infancy – thanks to the introduction 
of antibiotic therapies in the 1930s – decreases with the intensity of slavery in 1860. 
They interpret this result as a consequence of pre-Civil Rights barriers to realizing 
returns to human capital investment for blacks born in the South. The genetic resistance 
to malaria of African slaves has been suggested by Mann (2011) as the reason why 
slavery developed in the United States, and indeed Esposito (2013) documents a 
correlation between malaria suitability and the diffusion of slavery as well as slave 
owners' preferences for slaves more likely to be immune.  
 
To conclude, the evidence for the United States points to a robust influence of past 
slavery on inequality, while the influence on current income levels is somewhat weaker. 
The main channel of transmission is to be found in the unequal access to education and 
the accumulation of human capital for the descendants of slaves. The political 
mechanism behind the local provision of funding for schools determined an inferior 
level, both qualitatively and quantitatively, for the education inputs accessible for black 
children, with lingering consequences to the present day.  
 
Despite the fact that the Civil Rights movement and legislation have removed the most 
visible vestiges of slavery half a century ago, the debate of the consequences of slavery 
in the United States is still open. Julian L. Simon influentially contributed to it by 
proposing a calculation of the black reparations bill, which he estimated to amount to 
about $58 billion, i.e., about 7 percent of annual GDP (Simon, 1971). The awareness 
that the lingering influence of the history of blacks in America runs through the human 
capital channel is witnessed by the declared goals of recent federal education programs, 
from Bush’s No Child Left Behind to Obama’s Race to the Top, which have aimed at 
the removal of the racial and ethnic educational gaps that persistently afflict the 
American society. At the same time, however, the fact that in the United States 
inequality displays a strong racial component has not been sufficiently emphasized in 
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the recent debate on the long-term evolution of income and wealth inequality, propelled 
by the book by Piketty (2014).  Indeed in his analysis of inequality Piketty (2014) only 
very briefly mentions the racial gap in wealth, despite the fact that – as reported by The 
Economist (2015) – the median white family in 2013 owned net assets almost thirteen 
times larger than the median black family. Likewise, Putnam (2015) stresses the 
widening divide in attitudes toward nurturing children within all racial groups, thus 
shifting the focus from race to class as a driver of differences in educational 
achievement. He claims that achievement gaps between rich and poor pupils belonging 
to the same race are now larger than those between races of the same income level. In 
other words, according to his analysis the class gap has been growing within each racial 
group, while the gaps between racial groups have been narrowing. However, his 
conclusions can be challenged on the ground that they are driven more by the worsening 
performance of poor whites rather than by the improvement of that of blacks.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In his book “It's Getting Better All the Time: 100 Greatest Trends of the Last 100 
Years” (published posthumously as Moore and Simon, 2000) Julian L. Simon listed the 
decline of slavery and serfdom around the world –  from 75 percent of the population in 
1750 to 10 percent in 2000 (figures are from Engerman, 1996) – as one of the major 
achievements of civilization. Nevertheless, the evidence I reported clearly documents 
the lingering influence of past slavery on contemporary outcomes, both for the sending 
countries in Africa and the receiving countries in the Americas. This pervasive 
influence spreads across the economic, institutional, political, and cultural spheres.  
 
African slavery has represented one of the largest – albeit coerced – migration 
experiences in history. Some of the contributions described in this paper do consider 
some aspects of its specific link with the analysis of migration. Namely, in Bertocchi et 
al. (2015) my coauthors and I focus on the link between slave trades and contemporary 
attitudes toward citizenship acquisition for migrants across African countries. For the 
United States, in Bertocchi and Dimico (2012a) we look at the association between the 
distribution of the slaves disembarked along the North-Atlantic coast and the intensity 
of slavery in 1860, while Chay and Munshi (2013) emphasize the relationship between 
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plantation slavery and the Great Migration. However, a systematic investigation of the 
potential links between African slavery and contemporary migration flows and policies 
is still lacking, and therefore represents a  promising area for future research.  
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